In Lucky Lotto, the subject (I) has a very high justification for believing that the other person (you) has lost a lottery ticket. Nevertheless, when I found out that you (my peer) think you won the lottery, it seems like I should significantly reduce my confidence that your ticket is a loser. A mere degradation of your epistemic certifications on the basis of my previous high justification would be a completely unreasonable response on my part to this discovery.12 The argument in favour of divine sorority and the arguments in favour of religious pluralism can be understood both as calls to the first order as a greater meaning of religious disagreements. Let`s first look at Hick`s pluralism. Given that pluralism itself is a controversial and highly controversial religious point of view, the disturbing age raised by disagreements seems to apply, at least initially, to faith in pluralism and other religious beliefs. Considered first-rate evidence, however, religious differences support religious pluralism more than many other religious assumptions. If culturally-related frameworks of interpretation are as entrenched and meaningful, as pluralists claim, we should expect religious conversion to be quite rare and religious differences to be quite persistent, as is indeed the case. Many non-pluralistic religious perspectives will find it more difficult to go on this date. Similarly, the argument of the divine shadow is clearly a first-rate challenge and not a greater challenge to the theistic faith. Even if religious differences did not sanitize a higher order, the fact that they were significant and persistent differences on theism could still be first-rate evidence against theism. For example, even if a theist somehow knew that she and her cothetists had more evidence than non-theists, so disagreements about theism gave her no reason to question whether she and other theists had erred in assessing the evidence, the fact that many reject theism, even in the absence of information. , would still be evidence against theism, for the dominant disbelief in the face of atheism is more to be expected than theism.
In addition, it also seems that one can say all this, while the unwanted judgment is avoided that the subject is no longer justified in Elementary Math if one believes that 2 – 2 – 4. Although differences of opinion are epistemically significant, parallel arguments lead us to believe that an agreement is also important epistemicly. Individuals will generally have generalized consent to appeal to such extreme differences of opinion. Even though I know a peer who doesn`t believe that 2-2-4, I know many other colleagues and experts who believe the way I do. This gives me, in appearance (independent), the raison d`être of a disconnais of my fellow dissidents. We can imagine cases where our subject is unable to appeal such an agreement, but there are several reasons not to consider such cases as grounds for rejecting the Equal Weight View. On the one hand, the Justificationist View itself seems to have to make similar judgments in cases where we idealize potential calls to personal information. The defender of the Justificationist View may reply that such cases would simply be far too idealized, but it then seems that the same defense is open to the defender of equality. The fact that such experiences often play a major role in motivating and supporting religious beliefs is potentially important in assessing the epistemual importance of religious differences.